So I selected John Keegan's summary history of the conflict, aptly titled "The First World War". I had actually read it once before, about 11 years ago during my senior in college. I remember it being something of a slog, which was strange because other Keegan books I had read had been on point.
But the devil you know, right? So rather than spend money on a different summary history I decided to spend money on a digital copy of a book that I had already read once before. Funny old world, eh?
Maybe it is because I am more mature, but this time I found the book to be much more compelling. Keegan does an able job of summarizing the start of the war and the opening battles. I think something we often forget is that the first two months of the war were very fluid and dynamic, with some as room yet for heroism and initiative.
As things settle into stalemate and the fruitless trench warfare that most of us think of as we think of WWI, Keegan struggles to give the war some perspective, some meaning, though even he admits for a military historian charting the course of the war is very depressing indeed.
It actually makes the most sense if you look at it from the German perspective, which Keegan does well. After the Schlieffen Plan fails (Keegan argues that even the architects of the plan knew it could never really work) the Germans basically realize that their best bet is to hold out on the Western Front and try to win against their weaker Russian enemies to the east. If they can once again fight a one front war they might be able to amass enough men in the west to defeat a weakened France and a resolute Britain, before their country itself is exhausted. With the exception of the aberration of Verdun, it is a plan the Germans stick to as the years go by, and it might have worked if...
You guessed it, those pesky Americans! Over Thereeeeee....Over Thereeeee.....USA! USA! USA! USA! Get me a Twinkie and buy me some steak, the Americans save those sorry French asses for the first time. Sort of.
In 1918 the Germans have won the war in the east and are transferring men into the west for some massive offensives using new tactics (that presaged the Blitzkrieg of the second world war)...and they work to an extent. But here they meet the Americans, an army of a million dough-boys who fight with an utter disregard for casualties because they have not spent years in the trenches watching their friends die in a landscape that resembles the inner circle of hell. Most important they (and their British and French allies, who still fight tenaciously in defense) inflict casualties on the Germans that they simply cannot replace, particularly with regards to their non-commissioned officers, and as 1918 wears on their war effort simply implodes. They simply cannot match the sudden influx of Americans. It wasn't particularly their fighting skills (though Keegan gives props to the Marines at Belleau Wood), but more so the fact that they were there, and there were a lot of them, and there were more coming, and everybody knew this.
Keegan also does an excellent job of explaining why the war turned out the way it did, with neither side really able to make a breakthrough. It seems that technology had advanced to the point where the battlefield was hopelessly lethal but had not advanced far enough to coordinate those different lethal technologies.
Look - today, if you come under fire, chances are you know where you are and you have communications back to someone who also knows where you are. That person can dial in artillery and air strikes to obliterate thine enemy into tiny bits. I'm sure it's not that simple, but you get the idea. Communications are incredibly advanced, and allow for leadership (in theory) to coordinate efforts in the battle space and deliver lethality where it is needed most.
Not so in WWI. You may be fighting with the most advanced weaponry yet devised, but you are relying on telephones for comms with wires that often don't survive the initial bombardments that open any battle of the war. Now you are relying on runners, which chances are will not make it to their destination. Your infantry are in some place far away where you cannot see them, they have advanced but are now under counterattack. They have no comms and cannot call in pinpoint artillery to engage the enemy. They are alone, and they are at a disadvantage as the enemy gathers for the counter strike.
This a You Tube video that I think shows the problem very well. It's a little long, but I think it's worth it. Leave it to the British to make a World War I documentary somewhat cheeky and fun. I guessed they earned that right, at least.
Along the same lines, Keegan also argues that the generals were not quite as heartless and clueless as we thought. Some of them did learn and adapt, if not overcome. New techniques were tried to break the deadlock, and as the wore won the British in particular found that it was possible, through careful planning and a combination of mines, bombardment, tanks, and infantry supporting each other in assault, to make an initial attack with relatively (relatively being the key word) minor casualties, all things considered. But such gains could never be consolidated, as the German counter attack (which was their tactic of choice for much of the war) would inevitably stall any offensive. It's not a universal truth, and the late example of the waste at Passchendale sort of suggests otherwise, but its still true that commanders on both sides were able to make small improvements that did show some promise. But the communication breakthrough that was really needed was never realized.
So - if you were wanting to come to grips with the conflict, I can think of no better way. On the first reading, a decent book. On the second reading, an excellent one. Do yourself a favor and get a good book for maps or find some online...the military historian's penchant for Corps designations is alive and well.
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